POST 6: PROFITING OFF PAIN (Embedded/Incorporated Post)

When discussing U.S. immigration policy, the debate generally focuses on border security, deportation, and illegal immigration. However, there is another, less visible dimension that unfolds from these issues: the economy that has developed around immigration detention. Behind the political decisions regarding residency within U.S. territory lies a complex structure of public institutions and private companies that profit from the incarceration and surveillance of migrants.

The immigration detention industry in the United States is a convergence of politics, economics, and criminal justice, as the system not only responds to an administrative need of the State but has also generated a market in which private companies participate in the operation of jails, detention centers, and related services. In this way, irregular migration ceases to be merely a social or legal phenomenon and becomes an activity that also generates significant financial resources.

PROFITING OFF PAIN

According to the American University Washington College of Law report (2026), the expansion of immigration detention is linked to a historical process of criminalizing migration, especially through laws such as Sections 1325 and 1326 of the U.S. immigration code, which establish criminal penalties for unauthorized entry or reentry into the country. These laws transformed irregular migration from a primarily administrative matter to a criminal one, allowing thousands of migrants to be prosecuted and sent to incarceration systems.

This change had significant economic consequences: the more people are prosecuted, the greater the need for detention infrastructure, prison staff, surveillance services, and contracts with private companies.

From Border to Market: The Expansion of Immigration Detention

Immigration detention in the United States began as a tool of state control, but over time it has evolved into a system where private actors play an increasingly important role. Privatization has allowed private prison companies to manage facilities where immigrants are detained while awaiting court proceedings or deportation decisions.

American University Washington College of Law highlights the role of private prison and detention center companies, such as GEO Group and CoreCivic, which have received contracts related to immigration detention. These companies generate revenue through agreements with government agencies responsible for immigration enforcement, creating a unique economic model where the detention of individuals represents a source of income for private operators. In other words, a larger detained population increases the demand for prison services, leading to detention ceasing to be solely a control measure and becoming an economic activity.

In 2022, for example, private detention companies earned hundreds of millions of dollars from contracts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), demonstrating the financial weight this industry has within the U.S. immigration system.

Criminalization as an Economic Driver

One of the most important aspects of this analysis is that the detention industry cannot be understood separately from the laws that allow it to operate. The criminalization of migration creates the necessary conditions for increased demand for detention centers.

Before the implementation of these policies, many immigration violations were handled primarily through administrative procedures. However, by classifying certain immigration acts as federal crimes, the state opened the door to criminal prosecution and incarceration.

This model has a dual economic impact. On the one hand, it increases public spending on the judicial system, law enforcement, and prisons. On the other hand, it generates economic opportunities for private companies operating in this sector.

The problem arises when economic incentives conflict with humanitarian objectives. If a company earns higher revenues while holding a larger number of detainees, concerns arise that detention could become a practice driven not only by security or public administration concerns but also by economic gain.

The Invisible Costs: Families, Communities, and Human Rights

While the detention industry generates revenue for certain economic actors, it also produces social costs that are often less visible. The analysis explains that the application of criminal immigration laws can lead to family separation, difficulties in accessing immigration protection, and long-term consequences for those prosecuted.

When a migrant is sent to prison while facing criminal immigration proceedings, their children may be placed in the custody of state institutions or child protection systems. This generates indirect economic impacts because families lose income, their need for social assistance increases, and community networks are weakened.

Furthermore, a criminal conviction can affect the future possibility of obtaining immigration benefits, such as asylum or other forms of regularization. This means that a decision made at a specific moment can have economic and social effects for years.

From a broader perspective, immigration detention raises an important question: What is the true cost of a system based on incarceration? Although there are economic benefits for certain business sectors, the costs often fall on migrant families, local communities, and the public budget.

An Industry Sustained by Political Decisions

The immigration detention industry demonstrates how public policies can create entire markets. Laws determine who can be detained, governments allocate resources, and companies participate in providing services.

This does not mean that the existence of private companies is the sole cause of the problem. The central point is that when a policy generates economic opportunities, incentives can arise to maintain or expand that policy.

The U.S. case illustrates a complex relationship between the state and the private sector. The government defines the rules of the immigration system, but companies can profit from its implementation. Therefore, the debate on migration should not be limited solely to how many people are detained, but should also ask who profits from this process.

When Migration Becomes a Business

The immigration detention industry in the United States reveals a little-discussed reality: border control also has an economic dimension. The criminalization of migration has allowed for the expansion of a system where detention generates contracts, jobs, and income for certain sectors.

However, this model raises significant ethical and political questions. When deprivation of liberty becomes a profitable activity, there is a risk that economic incentives will influence decisions that should be guided primarily by legal, humanitarian, and social principles.

The analysis by American University Washington College of Law reveals that immigration detention is not only a tool of foreign policy or domestic security, but also an industry that moves millions of dollars. Therefore, understanding its economic effects is essential to analyzing how the United States manages migration and what interests lie behind its border policies.

Reference

 American University Washington College of Law. (2026). Profiting off Pain: Privatized Detention, Mass Surveillance and the  Drive for Immigrant Prosecutions. 

POST 5 - Embedded/Incorporated Post: The Illusion of National Security: Military-Grade Surveillance and Containment Tactics in Civilian Border Zones

The contemporary evolution of immigration control in the United States has transformed border spaces -historically civilian areas for transit and customs-into low-intensity militarized surveillance zones. At the center of this metamorphosis is the U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), a special operations component whose doctrines and deployments have severely eroded International Humanitarian Law (IHL) safeguards and international policing norms. 

This article explores how the application of military-grade tactics and technologies in civilian border zones creates critical legal gaps that strip vulnerable populations of their fundamental rights. We used the investigation of Dr. Byrne:

EXPORTING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICING NORMS: THE US BORDER PATROL’S “BORTAC” SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT PROMOTES VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT REFORM

1. The Root of the Legal Gap: From Riot Response to Paramilitary Force 

Originally founded in 1984 as a volunteer-based reactionary unit tasked with responding to riots in detention facilities, BORTAC experienced a massive doctrinal expansion following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and its integration into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the unit evolved into a “paramilitary force” operating in a hazy gray area “between a police force and military” (Byrne, 2023)

The legal gap emerges when agents trained under a combat paradigm—receiving advanced instruction in air operations, tactical combat casualty care, precision marksmanship, and helicopter rope suspension techniques—are deployed to manage civilian migration flows, asylum seekers, and minors. As highlighted by specialized literature and the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) guidelines, the war-fighting objective of a military is so "antithetical" to the police duty to serve the individual that their missions "contaminate" each other when they overlap. In practice, this shifts border enforcement into a low-intensity theater of operations where migrants are treated as a tactical threat rather than subjects of rights. 

2. Violations of the Principles of Necessity and Proportionality 

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) "International Rules and Standards of Policing," all law enforcement actions must be governed by four fundamental principles, including legality, necessity, and proportionality. BORTAC’s containment tactics systematically breach these parameters: 

• The Principle of Necessity: This principle mandates that law enforcement operations must "not affect or restrict human rights more than is necessary". Deploying special operations units armed with weapons of war to police civilian transit zones imposes an unnecessary restriction on the human rights of protected groups. 

• The Principle of Proportionality: This requires that law enforcement conduct must not "affect human rights in a way that is disproportionate to the aim" (Byrne, 2023). BORTAC´s history includes heavily armed, military-style raids and the deployment of toxic fumes or tear gas in domestic settings where children were known to be present - such as the high-profile seizure of young Elián Gonzáles in 2000. This demonstrates a severe disconnect between the civil objective of enforcing custody or inmigration policy and the military-style force utilized.

3. Border Externalization: International Zones of Legal Exception 

One of the most complex legal gaps is generated through border externalization. BORTAC has projected U.S. migration policy far beyond its sovereign territory, training local police and military units in approximately 30 countries, including Guatemala and Honduras.

By effectively "pushing out the US border" into Central American countries, the U.S. normalizes its exclusionary policies over populations that have no democratic input into them, while creating severe accountability gaps. Under BORTAC’s instruction, local forces set up documentation checkpoints and roadblocks to arbitrarily intercept migrants. These actions violate domestic and international norms, including the Central American Free Mobility Agreement (CA-4), which grants passport-free transit rights between signatory nations. Because BORTAC finances, advises, and trains these paramilitary forces, this outsourcing attempts to insulate Washington from legal liability under international law for violations of the principle of non-refoulement (non-return) and the right to seek asylum.. 

4. The Deficit of Transparency and Accountability

The final major legal vacuum is institutional. BORTAC’s operational design breeds opacity. A stark example occurred during domestic deployments in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, where masked federal agents abducted and arrested protesters using unmarked vehicles and uniforms completely stripped of identifying insignia.

Legal analysts and editorial bodies have pointed out that the complaint system within the U.S. Border Patrol is largely "ornamental" and "carries no real weight," allowing BORTAC operatives to act with "impunity". Without independent civilian oversight, visible badges, or public transparency regarding the costs and scope of its tactical mandates, the unit operates entirely outside the boundaries expected of a democratic police force.

Conclusions and Proposals for Reform

The application of militarized national security frameworks to civilian border zones has dismantled international humanitarian safeguards in favor of territorial exclusion through violent force. To mitigate state liability under international law and protect human dignity, the following structural reforms are urgently required:

1. Cease Training of Corrupt Forces: BORTAC must immediately end all financial, advisory, and training support to foreign national security forces that demonstrate a flagrant disregard for human rights obligations.

2. Organizational Separation of Duties: In line with democratic policing principles, BORTAC must undergo structural restructuring to separate military-style units (focused on combating violent organized crime and arms/drug trafficking) from units or agencies tasked with regulating migration and addressing the humanitarian needs of displaced populations.

3. Active Transparency Mechanisms: Ensure that all agents are individually identifiable during operations (via unit insignias and badge numbers) and subject the internal complaint framework to rigorous, independent civilian oversight.

Reference 

Byrne, M. (2023). Exporting violations of international policing norms: The US Border Patrol's "BORTAC" special operations unit promotes violations of international norms and requires significant reform. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 40(3), 452-490.